Measurement-device-independent randomness generation with arbitrary
  quantum states by Bischof, Felix et al.
Measurement-device-independent randomness generation with arbitrary quantum states
Felix Bischof,∗ Hermann Kampermann, and Dagmar Bruß
Institut fu¨r Theoretische Physik III, Heinrich-Heine-Universita¨t Du¨sseldorf, Universita¨tsstraße 1, D-40225 Du¨sseldorf, Germany
(Dated: September 17, 2018)
Measurements of quantum systems can be used to generate classical data that is truly unpredictable for every
observer. However, this true randomness needs to be discriminated from randomness due to ignorance or lack of
control of the devices. We analyze the randomness gain of a measurement-device-independent setup, consisting
of a well-characterized source of quantum states and a completely uncharacterized and untrusted detector. Our
framework generalizes previous schemes as arbitrary input states and arbitrary measurements can be analyzed.
Our method is used to suggest simple and realistic implementations that yield high randomness generation rates
of more than one random bit per qubit for detectors of sufficient quality.
I. INTRODUCTION
Random numbers are a fundamental resource for many
information-theoretical tasks, in particular cryptography. For
any task that requires secrecy, it is important that the random
numbers are unpredictable for every observer, also a potential
eavesdropper - a property, which is called true randomness
[1], or private randomness [2]. This notion crucially depends
on the process creating the random numbers and its underly-
ing physics, and not just the numbers themselves. In the deter-
ministic classical world, randomness is the result of ignorance
and hence a subjective property, which cannot be proven for
a powerful adversary. In nature however, private randomness
is made possible by the intrinsic unpredictability of quantum
measurements: even if the whole system is known, outcomes
cannot be predicted with certainty. Yet, even in quantum me-
chanics, true randomness cannot be certified without further
assumptions. This is because realistic settings always exhibit
a mixture of true quantum randomness and classical random-
ness. The latter may stem from uncontrolled environmental
degrees of freedom, but needs to be attributed to an eavesdrop-
per’s malicious tampering with the devices. The challenge
consists of separating and quantifying these types of random-
ness, while keeping the assumptions experimentally viable.
The amount of certifiable randomness depends on the level
of control over the devices [3]. Device-independent (DI) ran-
domness generation protocols [4–6] view all devices as black
boxes, and certify randomness via the violation of a Bell-type
inequality and thus require loophole-free Bell tests. While
these have recently been demonstrated experimentally [7, 8],
DI randomness generation setups are far from practical.
More practical schemes are obtained by introducing ad-
ditional assumptions, e.g. semi-device-independent random-
ness generation [9, 10], or the quantum steering scenario [11]
and others. In this work, we discuss measurement-device-
independent (MDI) randomness generation, of which a partic-
ular instance was introduced by [12] and has recently been re-
alized in experiment [13]. The MDI setup consists of two de-
vices: a well-characterized state source and a completely un-
characterized detector. While previous work [12] provides the
randomness generation rate of a specific two-outcome single-
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qubit setup, we introduce and analyze a general framework
which encompasses all MDI randomness generation setups,
with an arbitrary state source and detector. This allows us to
devise practical setups that yield up to twice the randomness
of the previous work [12].
This paper is structured as follows. In Sec. II we introduce
the general MDI randomness generation protocol. In Sec. III
we discuss the eavesdropper’s degrees of freedom and state
the optimization problem in terms of a semidefinite program.
Finally, examples and practical applications of our result are
provided in Sec. IV.
II. MEASUREMENT DEVICE-INDEPENDENT
RANDOMNESS GENERATION
A. Setup and Protocol
The MDI randomness generation setup consists of two de-
vices (see Fig. 1). First, a source, able to emit a set of well-
characterized quantum states of arbitrary (finite) dimension.
In particular, for the input a the state ρ(a) is sent. Secondly,
an uncharacterized detector which announces an outcome x
whenever a state was sent. The knowledge of the quantum
states and the measurement results are used to characterize
the detector.
We denote the user of the protocol Alice, and the adversary
Eve. Alice sets up the devices in a secure laboratory which is
shielded from any kind of information transfer to the outside
world. It is verified that the sending box has no further degrees
of freedom than to emit a quantum state upon receiving a spe-
cific input. The adversary Eve may have built the detector, but
has no access to the laboratory afterwards.
The sent states ρ(a) are selected via an initial string of ran-
dom numbers. Because of that, we describe a randomness
expansion scheme [2, 4]: a user with access to an initial ran-
dom string A = (a1, a2, . . . ) interacts round-wise with a de-
vice leading to a string X = (x1, x2, . . . ), containing the in-
and output of each round, respectively. The randomness ex-
pansion protocol then outputs a processed string X˜(X) which
is close to uniform, conditioned on A as well as on any side
information E previously stored in the device.
The MDI randomness expansion protocol is as follows:
1. For every round, do Steps 2-3:
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FIG. 1. The measurement-device-independent setup for randomness
generation (for details see text). The trusted source sends for the in-
put a ∈ {1, . . . , ns} a known state ρ(a) to an untrusted measurement
device (black box), which outputs x with x ∈ {1, . . . , no}. The out-
come randomness RX is characterized by the observed probability
distribution Pobs(x, a), i.e. the probability that the pair (x, a) occurs.
2. The sending box sends a state ρ(a) of dimension d with
randomly chosen a ∈ {1, . . . , ns} to the measurement
box. On average, this uses up
∑
a pa(− log2(pa)) bits of
the initial randomness per round, where pa denotes the
probability that ρ(a) was sent.
3. After the state ρ(a) has been sent, the measurement box
outputs x ∈ {1, . . . , no} distributed according to px. Po-
tential losses can be announced as an extra no-detection
outcome which is appended to the proper outcomes,
or the device randomly attributes measurement results
which contributes to the noise. The only requirement is
that the detector gives an outcome in every round.
4. After many rounds, Alice estimates the observed mea-
surement statistics Pobs(x, a) = paPobs(x|a), i.e. the
probability that the pair (x, a) occurs. From that the
randomness gain per round RX can be computed (see
below).
5. Alice uses some further bits of the initial random string
to post-process the raw output into a shorter string of
fresh private random numbers.
In the last step of the protocol, the user applies a quantum-
secure extraction protocol to transform the output string X to a
string X˜ that is close to uniform with respect to Eve and the in-
put. This can be done via seeded extraction, e.g. two-universal
hashing, for which some further random bits are needed. For
details, see [1] and references therein.
B. Randomness quantification
For the extraction protocol it is necessary to quantify the min-
imal number of bits needed for Eve to reconstruct the mea-
surement result from her side information, i.e. the conditional
min-entropy [14]. The single-round degrees of freedom in
randomness expansion can be described by a tripartite state
ρXAE on the single-round classical out- and input registers and
Eve’s system, which reads
ρXAE =
∑
x
px
∣∣∣x〉〈x∣∣∣X ⊗ ρAE(x), (1)
where {|x〉} denotes a family of orthonormal states on X. The
randomness contained in the random variable X, associated to
px, is quantified by the conditional min-entropy
RX = Hmin(X|AE) (2)
that measures the unpredictability of X with respect to the
classical system A and the quantum system E. For cq-states
it is known [15] that the min-entropy can be expressed via the
optimal guessing probability
Hmin(X|AE) = − log2(P∗guess(X|AE)), (3)
defined as
P∗guess(X|AE) = max{F(x)}
∑
x
pxtr(F(x)ρAE(x)) . (4)
Here, {F(x)} denotes a POVM on the system AE, i.e. a col-
lection of positive-semidefinite operators F(x) ≥ 0 fulfilling∑no
x=1 F(x) = 1.
III. ANALYSIS OF RANDOMNESS GENERATION
A. Eavesdropping characterization
Before introducing the degrees of freedom in the MDI setup,
we list the assumptions below.
1. The laboratory is shielded from any information trans-
fer to the outside.
2. The sending device’s behavior is fully characterized to
emit a single specific state ρ(a) upon receiving the input
a.
3. The measurement device employs an i.i.d. strategy, i.e.
it behaves independently and identically in each round.
4. We consider the asymptotic limit, i.e. the measurement
statistics is precisely known.
The first condition is necessary in any randomness expansion
scheme, since otherwise the generated output could be trans-
mitted to Eve directly. The second assumption is what dif-
ferentiates MDI from fully device-independent schemes. The
3third condition corresponds in the language of QKD to indi-
vidual attacks. In [12], the authors describe how to prove se-
curity of the MDI setup against collective attacks, solely by
employing the security proof against individual attacks and
convexity arguments. If the arguments given there hold, this
proof would also be applicable in our analysis, extending the
result to collective attacks. [16]
Given these assumptions, the eavesdropper’s most general
strategy in the MDI setup is as follows. Eve has built the
measurement apparatus that deviates from the honest device
in two ways (see Fig. 2). First, to obtain correlations with the
measurement outcome, she has hidden a system E′ in the box.
Her distant laboratory E and the hidden system share a state
σ that may contain arbitrary amounts of entanglement. Sec-
ondly, upon receiving the incoming states ρ(a), the measure-
ment apparatus performs an unknown measurement {G(x)} on
it and part of σ, leading to the outcome x in the lab. Eve aims
to adjust her state and the performed measurements in such
a way, that she is perfectly correlated with the lab outcome,
while producing the measurement statistics expected from the
device. Furthermore, the analysis includes the correlation of
the output system X with the input system A. Conditioning on
the input ensures the outcome randomness to be “fresh”, i.e.
independent of the initial randomness.
Lab
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FIG. 2. The graphic depicts the relevant systems, states and mea-
surement to estimate the randomness generation rate, which is con-
ditioned on the outside systems A and E. The primed systems are
contained in the measurement box and represent internal degrees of
freedom (E′) as well as the incoming state ρ(a) (A′). A further inter-
nal degree of freedom is given by the unknown measurement {G(x)},
which produces the outcome x in the laboratory. The stateσ provides
correlations between the detector degrees of freedom and Eves site
E.
B. Degrees of freedom in the MDI setup
In order to characterize the general way how the state in
Eq. (1) is obtained in the MDI setup, we introduce the relevant
systems and operators below. Each system S is associated to
a Hilbert spaceHS , on which the operators act.
1. A and X denote classical registers that store the input a
and output x of each round, respectively.
2. The incoming state ρ(a) is associated to A′.
3. Eve has equipped the measurement apparatus with an
additional system E′ that shares an arbitrary state σ
with her site E.
4. The measurement box performs an unknown POVM
{G(x)} with no outcomes on the primed system A′E′
whose result is stored in X.
5. The optimal POVM from Eq. (4) on AE is denoted by
{F(e)}, with e ∈ {1, . . . , no}.
In the following, we formulate the security analysis as an op-
timization problem, whereby A and E try to guess X, while
their operations are consistent with the classical data in the
lab. The initial average global state reads
ρin =
∑
a
pa
∣∣∣a〉〈a∣∣∣A ⊗ ρA′ (a) ⊗ σE′E , (5)
while the register X is initialized with an uncorrelated state.
We denote by ρin(a) the initial global state if a has occurred.
The box-measurement {G(x)}, which acts on A′E′, maps the
state on AE into an ensemble {px, τAE(x)} given by
τAE(x) =
1
px
trA′E′ (GA′E′ (x) ⊗ 1AE ρin) , (6)
where trS denotes the partial trace over S . According to
Eq. (4), these states are distinguished by a measurement
{F(e)}. Its outcome e = x represents the system AE’s guess of
the output x of the detector.
We denote the probability of the event (x, e) as px,e, which
is given by
px,e = pxtr(FAE(e)τAE(x)) . (7)
With that, the guessing probability from Eq. (4) can be formu-
lated as P∗guess(X|AE) = max{F(x)}
∑
x px,x. By combining Eq. (6)
and (7), we obtain
px,e = trAE(FAE(e) trA′E′ (GA′E′ (x) ⊗ 1AE ρin))
= tr(GA′E′ (x) ⊗ FAE(e) ρin) , (8)
where in the second line we have used that for all linear oper-
ators L1 onH1, and Γ12 onH1 ⊗H2, it holds that L1tr2(Γ12) =
tr2(L1 ⊗ 1Γ12). In Ref. [17] it was proven, that when condi-
tioning on classical information, here given by the register A,
the optimal measurement in Eq. (4) consists of choosing an
optimal POVM on E for each a, i.e.
FAE(e) =
∑
a
∣∣∣a〉〈a∣∣∣A ⊗ FE(e|a), (9)
4where {FE(e|a)} is a family of POVMs on E (with outcome e),
indexed by a, fulfilling
FE(e|a) ≥ 0,
∑
e
FE(e|a) = 1 ∀a. (10)
Next, we consider the action of the measurement FAE(e) on
the initial global state ρin(a) for an observer with access to A.
The state after measurement on E′E is given by
λe|aσE′E(e, a) = trA′A
( √
FAE(e) ρin(a)
√
FAE(e)†
)
, (11)
where λe|a denotes the probability to obtain the outcome
e given a, and σE′E(e, a) is the corresponding conditional
state. Note, that the unitary degree of freedom of the post-
measurement state will play no role in the following, as the
system E will be traced out. Since Eve’s outside labora-
tory has no access to the input, her description of the post-
measurement state is given by
∑
a paλe|aσE′E(e, a). Note,
that because of the preparation by measurement, it holds that
σE′ (e, a) = trE(σE′E(e, a)) is independent of a, when averaged
over e ∑
e
λe|aσE′ (e, a) = σE′ ∀a, (12)
i.e. the index a determines a particular ensemble
{λe|a, σE′ (e, a)} of the state σE′ . This is because a local mea-
surement, if the outcome cannot be communicated, does not
influence a remote part of a state. It is known from quantum
steering, that for a suitable global state, any local state can be
prepared by a measurement on the other side [18].
Altogether, we obtain
px,e =
∑
a
papx,e|a
=
∑
a
patr
(
GA′E′ (x)ρA′ (a) ⊗ λe|aσE′ (e, a)) , (13)
where only the (primed) degrees of freedom in the measure-
ment box need to be considered.
In our protocol we observe the statistics Pobs(x, a), which
constrains any valid strategy
Pobs(x, a) =
∑
e
papx,e|a
= patr(GA′E′ (x)ρA′ (a) ⊗ σE′ ) . (14)
Here, the average over Eve’s outcomes was taken, because
they are unobservable for the user, and we have used Eq. (12)
and (13) in the second line.
C. The optimization problem
We summarize the results of the previous section, by stating
the optimization problem for the guessing probability. Since
we are left with only two subsystems in the detector A′E′, we
omit the system subscript
P∗guess(X|AE) = max{G,σˆ}
∑
x,a
patr(G(x)ρ(a) ⊗ σˆ(x|a))
such that G(x) ≥ 0,
∑
x
G(x) = 1,
σˆ(e|a) ≥ 0,
∑
e
tr(σˆ(e|a)) = 1 ∀a,∑
e
σˆ(e|a) =
∑
e
σˆ(e|1) ∀a, and
Pobs(x, a) =
∑
e
patr(G(x)ρ(a) ⊗ σˆ(e|a)) (15)
The optimization runs over ensembles {σˆ(e|a)} with σˆ(e|a) =
λe|aσ(e, a) of arbitrary dimension and a POVM {G(x)} acting
on it and the incoming state. The fourth line represents the
requirement from Eq. (12), and the last line ensures that the
detector degrees of freedom give rise to the observed proba-
bility distribution. This optimization problem is not straight-
forwardly feasible, as it has a nonlinear target function with
linear and semidefinite constraints. However, we observe that
the degrees of freedom relevant for the guessing probability
can be combined into a single effective measurement acting
only on the known state ρ(a). For that, we define an effective
measurement Mx,e|a onHA′ via
Mx,e|a := λe|atrE′ (GA′E′ (x) 1A′⊗ σE′ (e, a)) , (16)
with which we can write
P∗guess(X|AE) =
∑
x,a
patr
(
Mx,x|aρA′ (a)
)
(17)
by comparison with Eq. (15). We will instead optimize over
a superset of the actual degrees of freedom relevant for the
guessing probability, that consists of linear operators Mx,e|a
on HA′ with semidefinite and linear constraints that follow
from Eq. (16). This, in turn, will yield an upper bound to
the guessing probability and consequently a lower bound to
the randomness gain. These constraints are as follows. The
operator defined by Eq. (16) is positive semidefinite, since all
constituents are positive semidefinite, and furthermore fulfills
for all a∑
x,e
Mx,e|a =
∑
x
trE′ (GA′E′ (x)1A′ ⊗ σE′ ) = 1A′ , (18)
where we have used Eq. (12) in the first equality. Thus, it has
the properties of a family of POVMs on HA′ , indexed by a,
where the outcome x goes to Alice and e to Eve. Two further
properties can be observed, which read∑
x
Mx,e|a ∝ 1, (19)∑
e
Mx,e|a =
∑
e
Mx,e|a′ , (20)
where Eq. (19) follows directly from Eq. (16), and Eq. (20)
follows from Eq. (12). Thus, strategies given by a POVM
5family {Mx,e|a} with properties (19) and (20) include the ac-
tual strategy (15), but may not fully characterize it. The new
formulation is characterized by only linear and semidefinite
constraints and due to the linearity of the target function can
be cast into the form of a semidefinite program (SDP).
Theorem 1. The optimal guessing probability in any MDI
randomness generation setup, subject to the assumptions ex-
plained in (III A), is upper bounded by the solution of the fol-
lowing SDP
P∗guess(X|AE) ≤ max{Mx,e|a}
∑
x,a
patr
(
Mx,x|aρ(a)
)
s.t. Mx,e|a ≥ 0,
∑
x,e
Mx,e|a = 1 ∀a,
∑
x
Mx,e|a =
∑
x
Mx,e|a

11
· 1 ∀e, a,∑
e
Mx,e|a =
∑
e
Mx,e|1 ∀x, a, and
Pobs(x, a) =
∑
e
patr
(
Mx,e|aρ(a)
)
(21)
The second line characterizes the operators {Mx,e|a} as a
POVM for each a. The third and fourth line ensure that the
POVM family {Mx,e|a} obeys the properties (19) and (20), re-
spectively, which follow from the form of the effective mea-
surement (16). The former property may be interpreted as a
nonsignalling condition between the detector and Eve’s site,
and the latter as a nonsignalling condition between the sys-
tems A and E. The notation [M]11 denotes the (1, 1)-element
of the matrix M. The last line ensures that the adversary’s op-
erations actually give rise to the observed measurement statis-
tics Pobs in the laboratory. The outcome of the SDP provides
via Eq. (2) and (3) a lower bound to the randomness generated
per round RX in the measurement-device-independent setup.
IV. RESULTS
For any MDI setup with arbitrary detector and state source,
the observed probability vector can be read into the SDP (21)
to determine the randomness of the output bits. In the follow-
ing, we will discuss which sets of states {ρ(a)} and observed
distributions paPobs(x|a) are optimal in practical setups.
Our model of the detector behavior consists of a proposed
ideal quantum measurement mixed with white noise
Pobs(x, a) = ηPid(x, a) +
1 − η
no
pa, (22)
where Pid is the distribution of the ideal measurement, η ∈
[0, 1] is a quality parameter, no is the number of outcomes,
and pa is the input distribution.
In order to characterize the detector, we make use of the
tomographically complete qubit state set {|+〉 , |0〉 , |1〉 , |+i〉},
corresponding to the ±1-eigenstates of Pauli σz and the +1-
eigenstates of σx, σy. We employ pure states since we wish to
minimize the input randomness.
An upper bound of the MDI randomness gain is given by
the classical conditional min-entropy of the in- and output dis-
tributions [17]
Hmin(X|A) = − log
∑
a
max
x
Pobs(x, a). (23)
In order to maximize this expression we need to have unbiased
measurement outcomes x for every input a. Since for an ideal
quantum measurement we cannot ensure unbiased outcomes
with respect to each of the input states, we make use of an in-
put distribution pa that is almost sharp, i.e. the first state |+〉 is
sent with probability q ≡ p1 → 1, and the other states are only
sent rarely to characterize the detector. We call the parameter
q asymmetry of the distribution pa. Furthermore, an asym-
metric choice of inputs is desirable for randomness expansion
in the asymptotic limit, as it reduces the input randomness,
see Step 2 of the protocol in Sec. II.
To make the limit q → 1 feasible in the SDP, we divide all
rounds into test and generation rounds: in test rounds, states
are sent according to a uniform distribution, and in generation
rounds, only ρ(1) is sent. The asymptotic limit is then de-
fined as: number of rounds N → ∞. Simultaneously we take
the limit q → 1 to ensure maximal asymmetry. Similarly to
QKD Eve’s optimal strategy is now as follows: She provides a
POVM that reproduces the expected measurement statistics in
the test rounds, but aims at optimally predicting the outcomes
of generation rounds, since test rounds have negligible contri-
bution to the total guessing probability in the limit q→ 1.
In this asymmetric scenario, the optimal situation for ran-
domness generation (expansion) corresponds to the measure-
ment statistics of a POVM with three properties: i) the POVM
is extremal [19], i.e. it cannot be given as a mixture of two
different POVMs [20]. This ensures that its outcomes cannot
be predicted by having access to a random variable (which de-
termines the mixing) and thus maximizes randomness with re-
spect to the measurement apparatus controlled by Eve. ii) the
POVM has unbiased outcomes for the first input state i.e. the
output distribution has maximal entropy. iii) the POVM has d2
outcomes for the state space dimension d. This is because d2
corresponds to the highest number of independent outcomes:
any further POVM element can be written as a linear com-
bination of previous ones, which amounts to classical post-
processing that cannot increase the true randomness. There-
fore, the maximally achievable randomness is 2 log d bits [21].
We stress, that this POVM is realized in the optimal honest
device, i.e. a device that implements a particular pre-defined
POVM. The semidefinite program, on the other hand, finds
the optimal measurement for Eve that gives rise to the mea-
surement statistics expected from the honest device.
A. Single qubit setups
From the previous section, it follows that a qubit measure-
ment can have up to 4 independent outcomes. In the follow-
ing, we compare the performance in randomness gain of dif-
ferent sets of sent states and numbers of outcomes. In practice,
6the configuration is chosen by taking into account which states
and measurements are most readily available in the laboratory.
In general, qubit POVM elements can be decomposed as
Mk = αk(1 + ~mk · ~σ) with
αk > 0,
∑
k
αk = 1,
∑
k
αk~mk = 0. (24)
where k = 1, . . . , no. To ensure unbiased measurement out-
comes with respect to the most frequent state, we require
〈+|Mk |+〉 ≡ αk(1 + ~mk · ~e1) = 1no ∀k = 1, . . . , no. (25)
Furthermore, we have the following extremality conditions
[19]. The POVM elements are rank-one, which is ensured by
normalized measurement directions |~mk | = 1. Additionally,
the measurement operators are linearly independent. This is
fulfilled, e.g. for four outcomes, if and only if the measure-
ment directions form a tetrahedron, i.e. they cannot lie in a
common plane.
Note, that not all αk can be equal, since then the prop-
erty (25) would force all vectors to lie in the plane defined
by ~mk · ~e1 = c, which violates the extremality condition. A
maximally symmetric 4-outcome configuration is given by
~m1 = ~e1 ~m2 = −17~e1 +
4
√
3
7
~e2
~m3/4 = −17~e1 −
2
√
3
7
~e2 ± 67~e3
α1 =
1
8
α2 = α3 = α4 =
7
24
, (26)
which we will make use of in the following.
Also, we will later employ a 3-outcome extremal POVM
given by
~m1 = ~e2 ~m2/3 = −12~e2 ±
√
3
2
~e3
α1 = α2 = α3 =
1
3
. (27)
The following graphic Fig. 3 compares the performance of
different numbers of outcomes and sent states in the asymp-
totic limit as a function of the detector quality η. For ns = 2
(ns = 4), states are drawn from the first two (all) elements
of the set {|+〉 , |0〉 , |1〉 , |+i〉}. The measurement statistics is
described by Eq. (22), where Pid is the distribution, which
we obtain if, for no = 4, the honest device implements the 4-
outcome measurement (26), and for no = 2 aσz-measurement.
The optimization is performed with standard tools such as
YALMIP [22], and SDPT3 [23] as solver. We observe that states
drawn from a tomographically complete set in test rounds are
clearly advantageous, since these allow for a better detector
characterization. Moreover, the figure shows that for fixed
input states, the performance of an extremal 4-outcome mea-
surement is, depending on the visibility, up to twice as good
as the best projective measurement. In particular, the maxi-
mal local randomness of two bits is reached for a noiseless
detector (η = 1). For a detector quality of η ≥ 97%, the setup
generates more than one random bit per qubit. In the special
case of a one-qubit sending box with tomographically com-
plete states in the asymptotic limit, and ideal statistics given
by a σz-measurement, our bound is equal to the exact formula
from previous work [12].
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FIG. 3. The randomness rate versus the detector quality defined in
Eq. (22) in the asymptotic limit and for q ≡ p1 → 1. The blue (red)
line depicts an extremal POVM with no = 4 (= 2) outcomes for a to-
mographically complete set of ns = 4 states. The ideal measurement
statistics arises from the measurement directions in Eq. (26) (no = 4)
and from a σz-measurement (no = 2). The green line corresponds to
the case of two non-orthogonal sent states and two outcomes.
1. Randomness for different relative angles
We are also able to study the angle-dependency between
two states of the MDI randomness rate. Consider the case of
the observed distribution (22), where Pid corresponds to the
statistics of a σx-measurement. For any α ∈ [0, 1], the two
sent states are drawn from the set {|φα〉 , |ψα〉} with
|φα〉 =
√
1 − α
2
|0〉 +
√
α
2
|1〉 ,
|ψα〉 =
√
1 − α
2
|0〉 −
√
α
2
|1〉 . (28)
Fig. 4 depicts the randomness generation rate for several de-
tector qualities as a function of α ∈ [0, 1]. For α = 0 both
states are identical |φ0〉 = |ψ0〉 = |0〉, and for α = 1 they be-
come orthogonal |φ1〉 = |+〉 , |ψ1〉 = |−〉. In both cases the
randomness generation rate vanishes, as expected. However,
we observe that for an infinitesimally small but non-vanishing
angle, we achieve near-maximal randomness for η = 1, indi-
cating that any amount of non-orthogonality in this scenario
forces Eve to provide the honest measurement. More specifi-
cally, the η = 1-line coincides with the classical min-entropy
7from Eq. (23). However, the feature of much randomness for
almost no quantumness comes at the cost of two requirements:
i) precisely characterized states to ensure that they are not
identical ii) precise determination of the observed measure-
ment statistics Pobs, because the randomness rate is discontin-
uous at α = 0, where no randomness can be extracted.
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FIG. 4. The randomness rate as a function of the angle parameter α
(see Eq. (28)) between two sent states for several detector qualities
η and asymmetry q = 12 . The statistics of the ideal measurement
corresponds to a σx-measurement. For α = 0, the randomness rate is
equal to zero.
2. The role of the asymmetry
In the asymptotic limit, and for a tomographically com-
plete set of sent states, a higher asymmetry amounts to a
higher gain in randomness for all detector qualities. However,
we make the intriguing observation that for two sent qubit
states {|+〉 , |0〉}, the optimal asymmetry depends on the detec-
tor quality. For that, we make use of an ideal statistics of a σz-
measurement. Fig. 5 shows that for detector qualities η & 0.8
maximal asymmetry q ≡ p1 → 1 is optimal, whereas for
lower qualities a more balanced input distribution performs
better. Because |0〉 is an eigenstate of the measurement, asym-
metric input distributions with higher |+〉-contribution have
less classical correlation of the in- and output and thus yield
higher randomness close to the ideal measurement. On the
other hand, the graphic indicates that asymmetric distributions
lead to higher correlations of the output and the detector de-
grees of freedom for an increasing noise level.
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FIG. 5. The randomness rate of a two-state two-outcome setup with
the sent states |+〉 , |0〉 and different asymmetry parameters q ≡ p1.
The ideal measurement statistics corresponds to a σz-measurement.
B. Multiple qubit setups
1. Performance comparison
Here, we compare setups consisting of a sending device
with states of dimension d and a measurement box with no = d
outcomes. In particular, the sent states are tensor products of
m single-qubit states which are drawn from either the first two,
or all elements of the set {|+〉 , |0〉 , |1〉 , |+i〉}. The measurement
statistics is described by Eq. (22), where Pid is the distribution
where the honest device implements a σ⊗mz -measurement. We
consider the asymmetric limit, in which the first state |+〉⊗m is
sent almost always. To account for experimental resources,
we normalize the randomness gain to the state dimension:
RX/ log2 d, which is the randomness rate per qubit.
Fig. 6 depicts the randomness rate per qubit for several
numbers of sent qubits m = 1, 2, 3 per round. States drawn
from a tomographically complete set in test rounds are clearly
advantageous, as the upper two lines show, since these allow
for a better detector characterization. Within our noise model
from Eq. (22), the normalized randomness gain is essentially
independent of the number of sent qubits. More precisely, it
slightly increases with dimension for four sent states per qubit
(upper two lines), and slightly decreases with dimension for
two sent states per qubit (lower three lines).
Furthermore, we have investigated entangled measure-
ments, such as a Bell state measurement, concluding that these
do not generate more randomness and thus provide no advan-
tage for increased experimental complexity.
2. Individual vs. coherent attacks for two copies
Next, we wish to compare the performance of a single qubit
setup with a two-qubit setup, in which all observable quanti-
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FIG. 6. The randomness rate per qubit versus the detector quality
from Eq. (22) for different setups in the asymptotic limit. The up-
per two lines correspond to setups with four different sent states per
qubit, whereas the lower three lines correspond to two different sent
states per qubit. The ideal measurement statistics is given by a σ⊗mz -
measurement, where m is the number of sent qubits.
ties correspond to two independent copies of the single setup.
This allows us to assess whether coherent attacks, which act
simultaneously on both qubits, provide an advantage over in-
dividual attacks. The results from Fig. 6 cannot be used for
that, since there the two-qubit probability distribution is not
the doubling of the one-qubit distribution.
Fig. 7 shows the difference of normalized randomness gen-
eration ∆ := RX(1-qubit) − 12RX(2-qubit) of a one-qubit setup
with tomographically complete states, and a two-qubit dou-
bling. The single qubit statistics is given again by Eq. (22).
The positive difference indicates that coherent attacks lead to
more predictive power for Eve in the MDI setup. However,
this assertion only holds if Eve can announce results of differ-
ent round measurements simultaneously. It is an open ques-
tion how Eve’s predictive power behaves in a sequential setup,
where she is forced to announce an outcome in each round,
but the device can have a memory. This means, that measure-
ments of different rounds are in tensor product form, and act in
general on the post-measurement state of all previous rounds,
as well as a fresh ancilla [6].
V. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
In this paper, we have introduced a general framework
for randomness generation (i.e. expansion) with a well-
characterized source of arbitrary quantum states and untrusted
detector with arbitrary measurements. We presented a ran-
domness generation protocol and analyzed its achievable gain
in randomness depending on the observed measurement statis-
tics and sent states. A lower bound on the randomness rate is
calculated by a numerically feasible semidefinite program.
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FIG. 7. The difference of the normalized randomness rates of a one-
qubit setup with tomographically complete states, and a two-qubit
doubling in the asymptotic limit. The blue line corresponds to a 3-
outcome POVM, whose statistics is determined by the measurement
directions in Eq. (27), and the red line to a projective measurement.
As an application, we have discussed several examples of
simple MDI setups and outlined optimal honest strategies. In
particular, we devised a one-qubit MDI setup with four out-
comes, which achieves more than one random bit per qubit for
experimentally achievable detector efficiencies. These setups
are practical compared to fully device-independent schemes,
since no loophole-free Bell tests are required. Moreover, they
achieve nonzero randomness generation even for low detector
quality, whereas DI protocols abort in this scenario [5].
Generalizations of our result are possible by relaxing as-
sumptions we have made. Of primary interest are attacks be-
yond the i.i.d. assumption. In this scenario, i.i.d. is relaxed to
sequential (round-wise) interaction with the devices, includ-
ing the possibility of a detector memory. For fully device-
independent sequential randomness expansion, it has been
shown [6] that for more than 108 rounds, the rate for gen-
eral attacks is essentially the same as for i.i.d. attacks. We
expect a similar behavior to hold in the case of MDI random-
ness expansion. The extension to a finite number of rounds
is expected to be straightforwardly implementable in the SDP
in Eq. (21). In analogy to parameter estimation in QKD, one
can replace equality in the last constraint by an appropriate
semidefinite constraint which includes the statistical devia-
tion.
By comparison with previous work [12], we noticed that for
the setup treated there, our lower bound to the randomness rate
coincides with their exact rate. It is an open question whether
this is the case in all MDI setups, which we leave for future
work.
Remark: During completion of this work we became aware of
recent related work [24], in which a comparable semidefinite
program was used to calculate the MDI randomness rate in a
two-qubit setup with tomographically complete states.
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